Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations by Juan José Ganuza
IGNORANCE PROMOTES COMPETITION:
AN AUCTION MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS PRIVATE VALUATIONS ¤
Juan-Jos¶ e Ganuzay
This version: March, 2003
Abstract
We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object to one of N risk-neutral
bidders with heterogeneous preferences. The auctioneer does not know bidders' preferences but
has private information about the characteristics of the object, and must decide how much infor-
mation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneer has incentives to release less
information than would be e±cient and that the amount of information released increases with
the level of competition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in a perfectly
competitive market the auctioneer would provide the e±cient level of information.
Keywords: Auctions, Private Values, Asymmetric information.
JEL classi¯cation numbers: D44, D82, D83.
¤I gratefully acknolwledge ¯nancial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under DGES
grant BEC 2000-1026. I especially would like to acknowledge Lambros Pechlivanos with whom I started to think
about this project. His comments and discussions were crucial in the initial development of this paper. I would like
to thank, Kyle Bagwell, two anonymous referees and Marco Celentani for their extremely useful suggestions. I also
want to acknowledge the helpful comments of Javier Asensio, Roberto Burguet, Antonio Cabrales, Aleix Calveras,
Maria-Angeles de Frutos, Jorge Duran, Belen Jerez and Jose Penalva. The usual disclaimer applies.
yDepartment of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Carrer Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005,
Barcelona, Spain; fax: +34-93-542 1746; juanjo.ganuza@econ.upf.es.
i\Lady Brandon treats her guests exactly as an auctioneer treats his objects. She either explains
them entirely away, or tells one everything about them except what one wants to know" Oscar
Wilde (1891) The Picture of Dorian Gray, reprint in Penguin Books, London, 1994, p. 14.
1 Introduction
One of the best known models in auction theory is the private value model. In this model,
an auctioneer wants to sell an object to one of N bidders with possibly di®erent valuations.
Bidders know their valuation of the object but do not know the value of the object to other
bidders. Typically, bidders' valuations are made up of two elements: bidders' preferences over
characteristics, which areexogenousand privately known, and bidders' priorinformation on object
characteristics. Most of the papers that analyze this model take bidders' information about the
object as given and therefore assume that bidders' valuations are independently drawn from an
exogenous distribution. In practice, there are many situations in which the auctioneer might
control the amount of information about the object that is held by the market. In this case,
the auctioneer does not regard the distribution of valuations as exogenous and must decide how
much information about object characteristics he provides to the market taking into account the
strategice®ect that thisinformation hason bidders' valuations. In this paper westudy a situation
in which bidders' tastes over characteristics are private information to the bidders but the object
characteristics are private information of the auctioneer. We ¯rst show how bidders' valuations
are endogenously determined by the information available on the characteristics of the object.
Then, we focuson theauctioneer'sdecision about how much information he reveals to the bidders
and solve for the e±cient and optimal level of information provided.
The way we model this is as follows: consider an auctioneer who wishes to sell a single object
to one of N risk-neutral bidders using a second-price sealed-bid auction. The auctioneer wants
to maximize revenue and has private knowledge about the characteristics of the object to be
sold. The object characteristics can be summarized as a point in an abstract product space. The
bidders are horizontally di®erentiated. Each bidder has an ideal point in this product space and
1his object valuation is decreasing in the distance between the location of his ideal point and the
location of the object. Bidders' preferences about the characteristics of theobject (the location of
their ideal points) are privateinformation. Prior to thebidding process the auctioneerdecides the
amount of information hereleases to themarket, anticipating how thisinformation a®ects bidders'
valuationsof the object. Theinformation provided by the auctioneer relates to thelocation of the
object in the product space. When the auctioneer provides more information, bidders estimate
the location of the object in the product space more precisely. Once the information has been
disclosed and the bidders learn their expected valuation of the object, the model proceeds as a
standard privatevaluations auction. The reason for this is that: (i) theauctioneer can control the
accuracy of thebidders' inference processbut he cannot observe bidders' valuations (since hedoes
not know their preferences); (ii) bidders know their own expected valuations but do not know the
expected value of the object to other bidders, since they do not observe their preferences.
This setup applies to situations in which there is asymmetric information on both sides of the
market with respect to the value of the object being traded: the seller knows more about the
characteristics of the object being sold and buyers have private information about their prefer-
ences. Two such situations spring to mind: the sale of a company, and certain kinds of internet
auctions. The owner of a company, for example, is likely to have more information about the
characteristics of the company than potential buyers, but idiosyncraticfactors of potential buyers
(such as distribution channels, corporate culture, technological or productive complementarities,
...) determine the synergies that arise from the purchase and hence the value of the company to
the buyer.1 As a result, the owner of the company must decide how much information to reveal
to the bidders without having directly observed theseidiosyncratic factors nor, consequently, bid-
ders' preferences over characteristics. Bidders, for their part, are likely to react asymmetrically to
the information provided by the auctioneer. For example, if the owner reveals information about
1When analyzing company takeovers, it seems natural to incorporate a common value component as well as a
private value one. Although in this paper we focus exclusively on private valuation auctions, ignoring the common
value component, our model canbe extended to deal with auctions that also include a commonvaluation component,
as long as that component is publicly known and additively separable. For a model where takeovers are analyzed
using private value auctions and where these issues are discussed in more detail see Burkart (1995).
2the ¯rm's corporate culture, some bidders will increase their valuations (the ones that have sim-
ilar corporate cultures) whereas others will have their valuations decreased. Although the seller
provides the information publicly, bidders' valuations after updating remain private information
because valuations depend on idiosyncratic factors. As for internet auctions, their growing im-
portance is evidenced by the great attention they are receiving from the public and the press as
well as in the amount of value that is being traded in this way. Every day hundreds of thousands
of objects change hands via internet auctions and many of these transactions match well with
the model we are proposing,2 in the sense that theseller often controls all the information that is
going to be made public to potential buyers (by posting electronicimages, providing text descrip-
tions, etc.) but he knows very little about the speci¯c preferences of the bidders who are going
to participate in the auction.3
The main result of the paper is that in situations such as those described above the seller
has incentives to release less information to bidders than would be e±cient. The intuition behind
this result is that, the auctioneer, by reducing the information held by the market, makes bidders
more homogeneous and thus promotes ¯ercer competition. In a nutshell, ignorance promotes
competition. We also show that when the market is more competitive (in the sense that the
number of bidders ishigher), theauctioneerreleasesmoreinformation. In particular, in a perfectly
competitive market in which bidders get no rents, the auctioneer would provide the e±cient level
of information.
Thispapershedslight on onetrade-o®in providing information in privatevalueauctions. First,
increasing information on the object to be sold improves the match between bidders' preferences
and thecharacteristicsof theobject, and by doingso increasesthewillingnesstopay ofthewinning
bidder and the revenues of the auctioneer. Second, more information about the object increases
theinformational rents of thewinning bidder, and this lowers the auctioneer's revenues. When the
2An empirical study of auctions on internet, Lucking-Reiley (2000), reports that online auctions currently trade
billions of dollars' worth of goods per year and are growing a rate of more than 10% per month.
3According to Lucking-Reiley (2000), collectibles (antiques, stamps, coins, toys, trading cards, etc...) are the
most traded goods. The collectibles ¯t well with the assumption of private valuations. Bidders preferences over
object characteristics are di®erent (depending on their particular taste and the collectibles they already own) and
private information to bidders. As in the previous example, therefore, the information provided by the auctioneer
is likely to a®ect asymetrically to bidders' valuations.
3auctioneer decides how much information he provides to the market, he has to optimally balance
these two opposing e®ects. Finally, the relative weight of these two opposing e®ects depends on
the number of bidders. When the number of bidders is higher, bidders get lower informational
rents, and the auctioneer will ¯nd it optimal to reveal more information to the market.
To illustrate our story, consider a very simple example. An auctioneer wants to sell an object
using a second-price sealed-bid auction. There are two risk neutral bidders. Each bidder either
likes the object and has a high valuation VH or hedoesnot likethe object and has a low valuation
VL. The prior probability of the two events is 1
2, so without additional information the expected
valuation of each bidder is 1
2VH + 1
2VL. If the auctioneer discloses new information about the
object, each bidder learns his true valuation, so that his posterior private valuation may be VH
or VL. Hence the auctioneer gets a low expected price (PD = 1
4VH + 3
4VL); the allocation of the
object is e±cient (the bidder with the highest valuation gets the object), and the bidders earn
positive rents. If the auctioneer does not disclose any information about the object we have that,
theexpected price is higher (PND = 1
2VH+ 1
2VL), thebidder with the lowest valuation can get the
object and bidders earn zero rents. Therefore, the lack of information about the object promotes
competition between biddersbut can also lead to an ine±cient allocation. If thenumberof bidders
is 3, the auctioneer is indi®erent between releasing the information or not, and if it is larger than
3, the auctioneer strictly prefers disclosing the information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brie°y review the related
literature. The model is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4 we show how the bidders' valua-
tions depend on the information the auctioneer releases concerning the object. Section 5 studies
the auctioneer's information release and characterizes the e±cient solution and the auctioneer's
optimal strategy. We conclude by discussing the scope and implications of the model. All proofs
are relegated to a technical appendix.
42 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature that studies endogenous information structures in auc-
tions. Milgrom and Weber (1982) study a similar problem in which a seller wishes to sell a single
object and has private information about its value. He must decide whether or not to reveal this
information. They assume that thetraders' valuations area±liated (roughly, the valuation of the
bidders and the seller are positively correlated) and provide the so-called linkage principle, which
states that the seller's optimal strategy is to providebidderswith as much information as possible
about the value of the object.4 The intuition behind this result is that by releasing all available
information the seller increases on average the losing bids (reducing the winner's curse), and as a
result increases the expected price of the object.5
The main di®erence between our model and the one analyzed by Milgrom and Weber (1982)
is the way in which information a®ects bidders' valuations. In their model, the valuations of the
seller and the bidders are positively correlated. This implies that all bidders react symmetrically
to the information revealed by the seller. In contrast, we study a situation in which bidders'
preferences about the characteristics of the object are heterogeneous, with the implication that
increased information about the characteristics of the object will raise the valuation of some
bidders and reduce the valuations of others.
In a recent paper, Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001) study the optimal auction design prob-
lem when the auctioneer can set the accuracy with which bidders learn their valuation of the
object in an independent valuations framework. In contrast to Milgrom and Weber (1982) and
thispaper, they allow theauctioneertocontrol theinformation structureof each individual bidder.
In other words, the auctioneer is in the position of letting onebidder learn his valuation perfectly,
while having a di®erent bidder only get a rough estimate of his valuation. They show that the
4Ottaviani and Prat (2001) extend the logic of the linkage principle to the standard non-linear pricing monopoly
problem. They show that the expected pro¯ts of a monopolist who sells to a single buyer cannot decrease by
committing to publicly reveal information a±liated to the valuation of the buyer.
5Perry and Reny (1999) and de-Frutos and Rosenthal (1997) show that the linkage principle might fail in multi-
unit auctions.
5optimal information structures are partitions and that partitions must be asymmetric across bid-
ders. They also ¯nd that the optimal selling strategy of the auctioneer can be implemented by a
sequence of take-it-or-leave-it o®ers.
Thefocus of ouranalysis di®ersfrom Bergemann and Pesendorfer(2001) in that we considerit
important to study situations in which the auctioneer's release of information is constrained to be
public. In internet auctions, forinstance, it isusually impossibleto identify activebiddersuntil the
moment in which they are bidding, and this makes the provision of asymmetric information very
di±cult. In regulatory environments, legal restrictions often require the auctioneer to publicly
release information in order to avoid favoritism or corruption.6 Even in situations in which the
auctioneer is able to provide information asymmetrically, the bidders can trade and exchange
information before bidding, undermining the desirable e®ects of information discrimination.
Given thedi®erent anglethey take, Bergemann and Pesendorfer'smethodology isvery di®erent
from ours. They assumethat theauctioneercan partition thesupport of thevaluation distribution
of each bidder and that bidders can privately learn the element of the partition in which his
valuation lies. The auctioneer chooses the accuracy with which bidders learn their valuations by
determining the ¯neness of the partitions. In contrast, we assume that bidders observe a public
noisy signal of the real location of the object in the product space. The auctioneer determines
the accuracy of the bidders' learning process by controlling the distribution of the noise. Our
approach allows additional insights to be provided on the way in which the optimal release of
information by the auctioneer changes with the number of bidders.
A number of other papers analyze endogenous information structures in auctions but they
focus on the incentives of bidders to acquire information rather than on the optimal information
provision by the auctioneer. Tan (1992) and Stegeman (1996) analyze the problem for private
value auctions and Matthews (1984) and Persico (2001) study the pure common value auction
and the case of a±liated valuations respectively.
6In practice, most public procurement processes make it mandatory for the sponsor to provide the same in-
formation to all potential contractors (see for example, the Green Book of Public Contracting in the European
Union).
6In a similar vein the literature on principal agent problems has also dealt with endogenous
information structures. Sobel (1983), Cremer and Khalil (1992) and Cremer, Khalil and Rochet
(1998) study incentive problems in which the agent decides whether or not to acquire private
information. Our approach di®ers from these single agent models in that in thepresent paper the
information acquisition process of the agents is controlled by the principal.
In terms of modeling choices our paper is closely related to Lewis and Sappington (1994)
who focus on information acquisition by consumers in a monopoly market. The authors examine
whether the monopolist should allow the consumers to acquire information about their tastes for
his product. Improved private information enables themonopolist to charge higherprices to high-
value buyers, but can also provide rents to the buyers. Most of their results are extreme, in the
sense that the monopolist decides to provide either all the information or none. Aside from the
di®erences in the information structures analyzed, our paper di®ers from Lewis and Sappington
(1994) in that the price is set by an auction mechanism. Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) obtain
similar results to Lewis and Sappington (1994) in an oligopolistic environment. They study a
situation in which two sellers compete for a single buyer who observes a private signal on the
relative quality of their goods. As in Lewis and Sappington (1994) and in thepresent paper, they
¯nd that sellers may lose from the releaseof publicinformation. Our paper di®ersfrom Moscarini
and Ottaviani (2001) in that we focus on the imperfect competition on the demand side in an
auction framework and we allow the seller to control the extent of buyers' private information.
In the same line of research, Bergemann and VÄ alimaki (1997) study information acquisition by
consumers in a duopolistic market in which one ¯rm introduces a new product whose value is
learned by consumers through experimentation. The authors show that in equilibrium the sales
path of the new product induces levels of experimentation that di®er from the e±cient ones. The
intuition is that both ¯rms want to speed up the learning process in the early stages in order to
obtain rents due to product di®erentiation. In this paper, the auctioneer induces a suboptimal
learning process to reduce bidders' di®erentiation and consequently bidders' rents.
73 The model
Consider an auctioneer who plans to sell an object. The object can have di®erent character-
istics that can be summarized by a location in a product space, x¤ 2 ©; where the product space
© is a circle of perimeter one. There are N risk-neutral bidders, i = f1;:::; Ng. The location
of each bidder, xi, which is private information, is uniformly distributed on the circle ©. Each
bidder has a preferred speci¯cation for the characteristics of the object, its location xi 2 ©, and
his object valuation for an arbitrary location x is vi(x) = V ¡¯(x¡xi)2 where ¯ is a measure of
the transportation cost of the bidders with respect to the product space. The market is initially
uncertain about the exact location of the object in the product space so that, ex ante, x¤ is
distributed according to the uniform distribution on the circle.
Before bidders make their o®ers, the auctioneer can provide information about the object's
attributes to the bidders and alter their expected valuations. We model bidders' acquisition of
information through the realization of a public noisy signal of the location of the object in the
product space, denoted by b x2 ©. The auctioneer controls the accuracy of this signal by deciding
how much information to provide to bidders. Obtaining and transmitting information is costly.7
Let ± 2 [0; 1) denotethecost incurred by theauctioneer in providing information, wherea higher
± implies a more accurate signal b x:
The relationship between the location of the object x¤, the public signal b x and the cost of







according to the distribution function G("j±). We make the following assumptions
about this distribution:
Assumption 1 The density function associated with G("j±) is symmetric and centered at 0:
Assumption 2 When ± =0, G("j±) is equal tothe uniform distribution on [¡1
2; 1
2]. When ± ! 1,
7This cost might include advertisement, research about product characteristics, providing testing opportunities
or samples to potential bidders, etc.
8the G("j±) converges to8:
G("j1) =
(
0 if "< 0
1 otherwise
Assumption 3 G("j±) is di®erentiable and decreasing (increasing) in ± for all " lower (greater)
than 0; that is,
@G("j±)
@± <0 for all " 2 (¡1
2; 0), and
@G("j±)
@± >0 for all "2 (0; 1
2).9
[Figure 1 around here]
Given these assumptions the public signal b x is also distributed uniformly around the circle,
and by Assumption 1 it isan unbiased estimator of thelocation of theobject in theproduct space.
Assumption 2 implies that when ± = 0 the signal provides no information, whereas when ± =1
the signal is fully informative. Assumption 3 implies that the varianceof the noise decreases with
±.10 Thus, when the cost of the information provided by the auctioneer, ±, is high, the signal b x is
more informative about the location of the object; this means that a more costly signal is more
informative, so that we will occasionally refer to ± as the amount of information of a public signal
with cost ±.
Once bidders observe the information released by the auctioneer (the public signal b x), the
distribution of x¤ is no longer uniform. Instead it is distributed on the circle according to a
8That is, as ± goes to in¯nity, the probability that " will be equal to zero converges to 1.
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mean ¹ = 0 and variance ¾ =
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10An assumption alternative to Assumption 3 is:
Assumption 3' If ± > ±
0 , we can order the distribution functions G("j±) and G("j±
0) in the sense of ¯rst order
stochastic dominance: G("j±) · G("j±
0) 8" 2 [¡
1
2;0], G("j±) ¸ G("j±
0) 8" 2 [0;
1
2]:
An example of a distribution that is consistent with this assumption is the uniform distribution on an interval



















1 if " >
1
2(1+±)
Under Assumption 3', using the techniques of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) we would obtain weakly monotonic
comparative results. Assumption 3 on the other hand lead us to strictly monotonic results.
9posterior distribution F(xj±) that depends on the realization of the signal b x and the amount ± of
information provided.11
After the auctioneer has released the information, the awarding process takes place. Bidders,
using the posterior distribution of x¤, update their expected valuations of the object and submit
their o®ers to the auctioneer. The auctioneer sells the object using a second-price sealed-bid
auction. For simplicity we abstract from reserve prices and assumethat the object is always sold.
Summarizing, the time sequence of the model is as follows:
1. The auctioneer, knowing the number of bidders, N, but not their preferences (locations)
decides how much information to provide to the market by choosing ±.
2. Given ±; bidders receive a publicsignal b x which is used as an initial estimate of the location
of the object in the product space.
3. According to ± and b x, bidders update their valuations of the object.
4. The second-price sealed-bid auction takes place.
Wehavechosen thesecond-pricesealed-bid auction forourmodel on thebasis of computational
simplicity and ease of presentation. As will be clear in the following, our setting satis¯es the
conditions of the revenue equivalence theorem which states that any auction mechanism in which
theobject isalways awarded to thebuyer with thehighest valuation and whereany bidderwith the
lowest valuation obtains zero surplus, yields the same expected revenue to the auctioneer. Thus,
all \standard" auctions (second-price sealed-bid, ¯rst-pricesealed-bid, oral ascending (English) or
oral descending (Dutch)) and many non-standard auctionssuch asan \all-pay" auction would yield
the same expected revenue to the auctioneer, bidders would make the same expected payments
as a function of their valuations and, as a consequence, the same results would be obtained.
11For notational convenience, we take the location of the public signal as the origin of the circle, and we de¯ne
F(xj±) on the interval [b x ¡
1
2; b x +
1
2]. Given the above assumptions on the noise distribution, F(xj±) presents
the following characteristics: (i) The density function associated to F(xj±) is symmetric and centered at b x: (ii)
When ± = 0, F(xj±) is equal to the uniform distribution on [b x ¡
1
2; b x +
1
2]. When ± ! 1, F(xj±) converges to:
F(xj1) =
½
0 if x < b x
1 otherwise .(iii) F(xj±) is decreasing in ± for all x lower than b x and increasing in ± for all x greater
than b x .
10We characterize the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium starting from the auction and moving back-
wards. In the next section we study how bidders update their valuation given ± and b x; and the
outcome of the auction. Section 5 focuses on the auctioneer's decision about how much infor-
mation to provide to the bidders. First, we characterize the e±cient solution of this problem
and then we characterize the auctioneer's optimal information release. Finally, we compare both
solutions.
4 Endogenous Bidders Valuations
The goal of this section is to study how the expected valuation of the bidders depends on the
distance between their locations and the public signal b x and how the distribution of expected
valuations changes when bidders update their valuations after observing b x:
Given the information provided by the auctioneer, bidders make an initial estimation of the
location of the object in the product space (they receive a public signal b x) and update their
valuations. Let V(xi;±) be the expected valuation of the object for a bidder located at xi, when
the amount of information is ±:
V(xi;±) =Ex¤fvi(x)g:
The following lemma shows us how the expected valuation of the object depends on the distance
between the bidder's location, xi; and the public signal, b x.
Lemma 1 If ± >0; then the expected valuation of the object is decreasing in the distance between
the bidder's location, xi; and the public signal, b x. If ± =0; the expected valuation is independent
of bidder's location and the public signal.
The intuition behind this result is the following. The valuation of the object is decreasing in
the distance between the most preferred location of the bidder and the location of the object x¤.
Since signal b x is an unbiased estimator of x¤, the expected valuation of the object is decreasing
in the distance between the bidder's location and b x. On the other hand, if the auctioneer does
not invest in providing information to the bidders, i.e. ± = 0, the object can be located with the
11same probability on any arbitrary place in the circle, implying that the expected valuation of any
bidder is the same.
Let x1 be the location of the bidder closest to b x . An immediate corollary of the previous
Lemma characterizes the bidder with the highest valuation.
Corollary 1 The highest expected valuation is the valuation of the closest bidder to b x; V(x1;±):
Notice that the bidder closest to b xmay turn out not to be the bidder with thehighest ex-post
valuation of the object. It can be shown that the probability of this event is decreasing in the
amount of information provided by the auctioneer.
4.1 Bidders' valuations distribution
Once the auctioneer's information is revealed and bidders update their valuations, we can
regard our model as a standard private value auction model. Each bidder is characterized by his
expected valuation vi, which is private information to him, and it is common knowledgethat each
bidder's valuation vi is an independent realization of a continuous random variable distributed
over [v; v] according to H(v; ±) where v = V( b x+ 1
2; ±) and v = V( b x; ±).12 Given Lemma 1 the
expected valuation of the object is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of the distance
between a bidder's location, xi; and b x, so that the distribution of valuations H(v; ±) can be
obtained by computing the distribution of the distances between bidders' locations and b x using a
simple change of variable.13
To ¯nish this section, we present the outcome of the awarding process.
Lemma 2 The bidder closest to b x wins the second-price sealed-bid auction at a price equal to the
expected valuation of the second closest bidder, V(x2;±).
12Notice that the bidders' valuations are independently distributed and privately known, since their locations
were independently distributed and privately known.
13Notice that given that the bidder's location are distributed according to a uniform distribution over the circle,
the distance between the location of the bidders and b x is also distributed according with to a uniform distribution
over the interval [0;
1
2]. Further details and additional characterization of H(v;±) are provided in the appendix.
125 Information Release
In this section, we study the amount of information about product characteristics that the
auctioneerwill provide to the bidders. Westart by characterizing thee±cient information release.
5.1 E±cient Information Release
The objective of this section is to characterize the e±cient information release, which is that
which maximizes the total surplus, namely the sum of the auctioneer's revenue and the utility of
the winning bidder (the bidder with the highest expected valuation).
The expected valuation of the winning bidder at the initial stage, V(±), is a function which
only depends on the amount of information:
V(±) =Ex1;x¤fV(x1;±)g:
The next result characterizes the relationship between this expected winning valuation and the
amount of information provided by the auctioneer.
Lemma 3 The expected valuation of the winning bidder, V(±), is increasing in the amount of
information, ±.
Lemma 3 rests on the fact that the greater the information provided to bidders, the better
the matching between the object and the preferences of the winning bidder.
Given theabove, thee±cient information release, ±E, arises from theoptimal tradeo®between




Ex1;x¤fV(x1; ±) ¡±g: (1)
First observe that given that V(x1; ±) is bounded from above, ±E has to be ¯nite. In thefollowing
we will assume that ±E > 0; an assumption which is justi¯ed if the cost of providing very basic
information about the object is su±ciently small. Then we have the following:
13Proposition 2 The e±cient amount of information, ±E , is increasing both in the number of
bidders, N , and in the transportation cost parameter, ¯.
The valuation of the winning bidder depends on the distance between his location and the
actual location of the object in the product space. When the number of bidders increases, the
expected distance between the initial estimate of the object's location b x and the location of the
winning bidder decreases. As a result, the incentives to make b x closer to the actual location of
the object x¤ also increase. Using a similar argument, if the parameter ¯ increases, the incentive
to reduce the distance between the location of the winning bidder and the actual location of the
object increases (the match between the object and the winning bidder's preferences becomes
more important). The only way to ensurean appropriate match is to reducethe distance between
the actual location of the object and the initial bidders' estimate and this, in turn, can only be
accomplished by increasing the information provided to bidders.14
5.2 The Auctioneer's Optimal Information Release
The objective of this subsection is to characterize the information release that maximizes the
auctioneer'srevenue. First, we study how the expected rents of the winning bidderdepend on the
amount of information provided by the auctioneer. The informational rents of thewinning bidder
are the di®erence between his valuation and the valuation of the second closest bidder (which is
the price of the object)
¦w(±) =V(x1; ±) ¡V(x2; ±):
Proposition 3 The expected informational rents of the winning bidder are increasing in ±.
This is an important result: when the amount of information provided to the bidders about
object characteristics is higher, the value of private information on preferences over object char-
14Notice that we have not imposed assumptions on the convexity of the problem and therefore cannot guarantee
that the problem is concave. We use the techniques of Edlin and Shannon (1998), which allow us to get comparative
statics results innon-convexproblems, aslong as the cross derivative conditions are globally satis¯ed by the problem,
a condition that is satis¯ed in our case.
14acteristics is higher. The implication of this result is that it can be optimal for the auctioneer to
restrict the information provided to the market in order to control bidders' rents.
The auctioneer's optimal information release, ±A; maximizes the di®erence between the ex-




By comparing (1) and (2) it is easy to see that the expected revenue of the auctioneer does not
depend on the location of the winning bidder (as is the case in the total surplus), rather on the
location of the bidder which is the second closest to the estimate of the object location, b x. Apart
from this fact, the auctioneer's problem is identical to the total surplus maximization problem,
and the intuition behind the results presented in the following Proposition is the same as in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 The optimal amount of information ±A provided by the auctioneer is increasing
both in the number of the bidders, N; and in the transportation cost parameter, ¯:
We assume that ±A > 0; as in Proposition 2. The following theorem presents the main result
of the paper.
Theorem 5 The auctioneer provides less information to bidders than would be e±cient, ±A <±E.
The di®erence between the e±cient information release and the equilibrium information release
converges to 0 as the number of bidders goes to in¯nity.
As was remarked above, the auctioneer's problem would be equivalent to the total surplus
maximization problem if in the latter we considered the second closest bidder instead of the
closest bidder. Using this, it is then easy to see the intuition of Theorem 5. From Proposition
2 we know that the larger the number of bidders, the closer the location of the winning bidder
to b x, and the greater the incentives to provide more information to the market. Using the same
argument, if we take the second closest bidder instead of the closest bidder, there should be less
15incentives to provide information to the market.15




This formulation clari¯es an important trade-o® when providing information to the market.
On the one hand, when the auctioneer provides more information, the e±ciency of the auction
process goes up (Ex1fV(x1;±)g is increasing in ± from Lemma 3). This follows because the
winning bidder is more likely to be the bidder with the highest ex-post valuation of the object.
On the other hand, the increase in information also raises the informational rents of the winning
bidder (¦w(±) is increasing in ± from Proposition 3). The optimal balance of these two opposing
e®ects leads the auctioneer to provide less information than would be e±cient.16 In other words,
the auctioneer will restrict the information released to the market in order to make the potential
bidders more homogeneous, with the underlying goal of intensifying competition and increasing
his expected revenue.
Finally, when the number of bidders goes to in¯nity, the rents of the closest bidder converges
to 0 because the expected distance to the second closest bidder also converges to 0. In such a
case, the auctioneer's trade o® between reducing the bidders' rents and increasing the auction
e±ciency is eliminated as can be seen from the fact that Ex1;x2fV(x1;±) ¡V(x2; ±)g goes to 0.
15In the paper it is assumed that the provision of some information is socially e±cient. We could also consider
the case in which it is e±cient not to provide information at all. In this case, it can be shown that it would still
to be optimal for the auctioneer not to release any information. I thank a referee for pointing out this extension of
the result.
16The results of Theorem 5 are obtained under the assumption that the object is always sold. The seller could
improve his outcome by introducing a reserve price in the auction. Clearly, this case would require a more detailed
analysis, but we believe that the same type of result would also hold. The idea goes as follows. We have shown
that providing information to buyers has the drawback of increasing their informational rents; however, a reserve
price could be used by the seller to reduce these rents. On the one hand, this implies that a seller using an optimal
reserve price would have incentives to provide more information than otherwise. On the other hand, since optimal
reserve prices reduce but do not eliminate informational rents, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the seller
would not have incentives to provide the e±cient amount of information.
166 Conclusions
Most of the research in auction theory presumes that the information held by bidders is
exogenous. In contrast, wehave analyzed a model in which theauctioneer has privateinformation
about the characteristics of the object to be sold and can control how much information to reveal
to bidders. We have shown how the auctioneer provides less information than would be e±cient
since by doing so he reduces the informational rents of the winning bidder. Moreover, we have
identi¯ed some factors that may in°uence the amount of information that the auctioneer will
provide to the bidders. In particular, we have shown that a more competitive market will induce
the auctioneer to provide more information. In the limit, when the number of bidders goes to
in¯nity, the auctioneer optimally releases the e±cient amount of information.
One important di®erence between our model and the standard auction models is that we
endogenizethedistribution of biddervaluations. Ratherthan taking thedistribution of valuations
as exogenous, we have allowed bidders to have exogenous privately known preferences but have
speci¯ed how the information provided by the auctioneer on object characteristics interacts with
preferences to generate ex-post distributions of private valuations. We do not treat the problem
in full generality. In particular, ¯rst we assume that the information provided by the auctioneer
is related only to the location of the good in the product space, and second that the auctioneer
provides information to all agents symmetrically.
Thesymmetry imposed on theproduct spaceand on thedistribution of thebidders' preferences
implies that the auctioneer has no ex-ante motives to distort information, as all locations give
him the same expected revenue. This allows us to ignore all problems related to the strategic
revelation of information without assuming that the auctioneer can commit to not censoring
the information (only providing favorable information), as in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and
Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001). By isolating the decision of how much information to reveal
we have found that there are two factors that determine the optimal provision of information:
(i) improved information increases the e±ciency of the auction; (ii) improved information also
17increases the informational rents of the winning bidder. These two e®ects represent opposing
forces for the auctioneer: improved e±ciency raises revenues while increased informational rents
reduce revenues. As the number of bidders rises, the ¯rst e®ect is increased and the second
e®ect is reduced. Hence, the auctioneer provides more information, so competition increases
the information provided. Further research is needed to extend these results to more realistic
environments with non-homogeneous product spaces and more general preference distributions,
where the strategic revelation of information will have to be incorporated into the analysis.
Finally, let me point out that the idea behind this paper can be used to explain the presence
of cost overruns in public works. A companion paper, Ganuza (2000), studies cost overruns in a
procurement model in which a sponsor wants to undertake a public work that can have di®erent
designs.17 The design space is a circle and N potential contractors compete to be awarded the
contract. Like bidders in the present paper, the contractors are horizontally di®erentiated, in this
case according to their specialization in a speci¯c design (their location), and they face a cost
of realizing an arbitrary design that is increasing with its distance from its location. Unlike the
present paper, however, the sponsor does not know his preferred design. Prior to the awarding
process the sponsor decides how much to invest in specifying an initial design (or blueprint) for
the public work and this decision becomes public information. Similar to the present paper,
on the other hand, the initial design can be considered as a noisy signal of the optimal design.
Thesponsor auctions the realization of this initial design and the winning ¯rm signs a contract to
undertakethisinitial design. Duringtheconstruction of theproject, thesponsorand the¯rmlearn
theoptimal design, and renegotiate theinitial contract. Cost overruns, i.e. thedi®erence between
the ¯nal price of the project and the procurement price are a consequence of this renegotiation.
In such a framework, when the sponsor invests more in the speci¯cation of the initial design,
theinitial design is morelikely to becloserto theoptimal one, substantial reforms areless likely to
be necessary, and cost overruns are less likely to be sizable. As is often claimed, a low investment
17The companion working paper is entitled \Competition and Cost Overruns. Optimal Misspeci¯cation of Pro-
curement Contracts". This working paper is available from the author upon request and can be downloaded at
http://www.econ.upf.es/cgi-bin/onepaper?471.
18in the initial design speci¯cation is likely to lead to negotiating signi¯cant changes and therefore
to high cost overruns. However, investing in design speci¯cation is shown to have a drawback, as
it increases the rents of the winning ¯rm. This implies that the optimal strategy of the sponsor
is to underinvest in design speci¯cation so as to make signi¯cant cost overruns likely. The key
idea is the same as the one in this paper: by reducing design speci¯cation (information about the
optimal design) the sponsor promotes ¯ercer competition among contractors. As in this paper,
an increase in the number of potential contractors increases the level of optimal speci¯cation and,
in a perfectly competitive market, no such misspeci¯cation occurs.18
7 Appendix
As a convention and without loss of generality we are going to consider in the appendix that
b x = 0 and that xi;x1;x2 2 [0; 1
2]. Notice that with this convention the location of the bidders
xi;x1;x2 are also their distance to b x . We need to state some preliminary facts before we start
with the proofs of the results.
Let Gx1(x; N) and Gxi(x; N) be the distributions of the expected distance between the public
signal b x and (i) the closest bidder and (ii) the bidder i closest to b x. These distributions do not
depend on b x and it can be shown that
@Gx1(x;N)
@N < 0 8x2 (0; 1
2). These distributions are ordered
in a strict ¯rst order stochastic dominance sense: Gx1(x; N) >Gxi(x;N), for all x 2 (0; 1
2):
Proof of Lemma 1: The expected valuation of an arbitrary bidder xi, given that b x=0 and the
amount of information is ±; is
V(xi; ±) = Ex¤fV ¡¯(xi ¡x¤)2j±g:
Since x¤ is distributed on [¡1
2; 1







¯ minf(xi ¡s)2; (1 ¡jxi¡sj)2gf(sj±)ds:
Notice that, due to the fact that the product space is a circle, there are two distances between xi
18These results do not depend on speci¯c design renegotiation procedures, since the incumbent rents of the
renegotiation are discounted by the potential contractors in the auction. See Ganuza (2000) for details.
19and x¤ and we have to consider only the shortest length arc.




















By using the symmetry of F(xj±) we get










¯((xi ¡s)2 +(1 ¡xi¡s)2)f(sj±)ds











Integrating by parts the second term we get















It is interesting to see the special cases ± = 0 and ± =1. We have that





If the public signal b x=0 is not informative, the bidder's expected valuation does not depend on
his location. On the other hand
V(xi;1) = V ¡¯xi
2;
when there is perfect information about the object's location, so ± = 1. Here, the expected
valuation only depends on the location of the bidder. For interior cases, we di®erentiate V(xi;±)












@xi = 0: Furthermore, F(1
2 ¡xij±) is increasing in ±; and therefore
@V(xi;±)
@xi < 0 for
all ± > 0: The valuation of the object is therefore decreasing in the distance between the public
signal b x and the bidder's location. Q:E:D:
Proof of Corollary 1: Immediate from Lemma 1. Q:E:D:
20Characterization of the distribution of valuations H(v;±): Let s(v;±) be the inverse func-
tion of V(xi;±) when xi 2 [0; 1












where, we are using the fact that the distance between an arbitrary bidder and b x is dis-
tributed according to a uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1
2]. As the distance varies over
the interval [0; 1
2]; and V(xi;±) is decreasing when xi 2 [0; 1
2], it is found that the valuations
vary over [v;v] where v = V(1
2; ±) and v = V(0; ±): As F(xij±) is increasing in ± we can show
that v = V(1
















is increasing in ±: When ± = 0; F(xij0) is uniform, and v and v
coincide: Thus, the larger is ±, the more spread the distribution, and the larger the interval [v;v]:














¯dv =1¡U(s(v; ±)) =1 ¡2s(v;±)
where U(:) is the uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1
2].
Proof of Lemma 2: Immediate from Lemma 1. Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 3: The expected highest valuation, given that thewinning bidder isthe closest
bidder to the public signal b x, is
V(±) =Ex1fV(x1;±)g = Ex¤;x1fV ¡¯(x1 ¡x¤)2j±g
Therefore, to prove thelemma wehave to show that Ex¤;x1f( x¤¡x1)2j±g is decreasing in ±: First,
we analyze the sum of the expected quadratic distance between the real location of the object
and all the bidders. Let Ai be the expected quadratic distance between the real location of the
object and the bidder which is the bidder i closest to the public signal b x.
N X
i=1
Ai = Ex¤;x1f(x¤ ¡x1)2j±g
+Ex¤;x2f(x¤ ¡x2)2j±g +¢ ¢¢ +Ex¤;xNf(x¤ ¡xN)2j±g:
21Rearranging terms we get
N X
i=1




It is clear that this sum does not depend on ± since the relative position of the bidders is not
important when we are adding all the distances. Therefore, the derivative of this sum respect to










The next step is to show that
@(Ai¡A1)
@± > 0 for every i 6= 1 . Using similar computations to






















































@± > 0 and Gx1(z; N) >Gxi(z;N) 8z 2 (0; 1
2). But given that the derivative of the sum
is 0, and given that
@(Ai¡A1)
@± >0 for every i 6=1; this implies that @A1
@± < 0, which concludes the
proof. Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 2: We are going to use a result of Edlin and Shannon (1998), which
allows us to obtain strictly monotonic static comparative results without making assumptions on
the concavity of the distribution functions.
Theorem 6 (Edlin and Shannon (1998)) Let S ½ <; f : <£< ! <; y¤ 2 argmaxy2S f(y; t¤)
and y0 2 argmaxy2S f(y; t0): Suppose that f is C1 and has increasing marginal returns, and that
y¤ 2 int S . Then y0 > y¤ if t0 >t¤, and y0 < y¤ if t0 <t¤:
19Notice that xx and x
¤ are independent variables, and we do not need to specify the joint distribution.











































where y = ±;t = N;and S = <+ [ 0: Therefore, the only condition that we have to check is that
f(y;t) has increasing marginal returns, so that @f
@y is increasing in t:
To verify this condition, we compute the cross derivative @2f
@N@±. First, from di®erentiating























Integrating by parts and di®erentiating
@f


















@± > 0 and
@Gx1(z;N)
@N > 0 we have that the whole expression is positive, and hence
f(±;N) has increasing marginal returns. Therefore, applying Theorem 6 we conclude that the
e±cient amount of information ±E is increasing in the number of bidders N:











































23is negative. Then, applying Theorem 6, we conclude that e±cient amount of information ±E is
increasing in ¯. Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 3: The informational rents of the winning bidder are the di®erence
between his valuation and the expected valuation of the second closest bidder to thepublic signal
b x:






















































(Gx1(z; N) ¡Gx2(z; N))dz
This expression is positive, since
@F(1
2¡zj±)
@± > 0, and Gx1(z;N) > Gx2(z;N) for all z 2 (0; 1
2).
Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 4: We follow the same argument that we have used in the proof of
Proposition 2. Q:E:D:




This problem is equivalent to
±A 2 argmax
±A
Ex1;x2fV(x1; ±) ¡± ¡¦w(±)g
where¦w(±) = Ex1fV(x1; ±)g¡Ex2fV(x2;±)g are the expected informational rentsof thewinning
bidder. From comparing this formulation of the auctioneer's problem to the formulation of the
social welfare maximization problem (equation 1 ), it is clear that we cannot have ±A = ±E; as
24the ¯rst order conditions cannot be satis¯ed for the same ± for the two problems. Furthermore,
if ±A > ±E, we would have
Ex2;x1fV(x1; ±A) ¡±A ¡¦w(±A)g ¸Ex2;x1fV(x1; ±E) ¡±E ¡¦w(±E)g
As, by Proposition 3, ¦w(±) is increasing this would imply
Ex2;x1fV(x1;±A) ¡±Ag >Ex2;x1fV(x1; ±E) ¡±Eg
a contradiction. Q:E:D:
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Figure 1: Two arbitrary density functions of " where ± >±0:
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